Self-Rewards and Personal Motivation

23 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2012

See all articles by Alexander K. Koch

Alexander K. Koch

University of Aarhus - Department of Economics and Business Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Julia Nafziger

Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences

Anton Suvorov

New Economic School (NES); National Research University Higher School of Economics

Jeroen van de Ven

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: July 4, 2012

Abstract

Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended to increase personal motivation. We show that in a model with time-inconsistent and reference-dependent preferences, self-rewards can be a credible and effective tool to overcome self-control problems. We also characterize the type of self-rewards that can be used, such as vice goods and virtue goods, and analyze which types of goods will be preferred by the individual.

Keywords: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, reference-dependent preferences, loss aversion, self-control, self-rewards, goals

JEL Classification: D03, D81, D91

Suggested Citation

Koch, Alexander K. and Nafziger, Julia and Suvorov, Anton and van de Ven, Jeroen, Self-Rewards and Personal Motivation (July 4, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2100579 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2100579

Alexander K. Koch

University of Aarhus - Department of Economics and Business Economics ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
Aarhus V, 8210
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/alexanderkkoch/Home

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Julia Nafziger

Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences ( email )

Fuglesangs Allee 4
Aarhus V, DK 8210
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/julianafziger/

Anton Suvorov (Contact Author)

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

Nobel Str., 3
Moscow, Skolkovo 121205
Russia
+74959569508 (Phone)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Shabolovka 26
Moscow, 119049
Russia

Jeroen Van de Ven

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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