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The Efficiency of Droit De Suite: An Experimental Assessment

29 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2012  

Maryam Dilmaghani

Saint Mary's University, Sobey School of Business, Department of Economics

Jim Engle-Warnick

McGill University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 5, 2012

Abstract

Droit de suite entitles visual artists to a percentage share of the resale price every time their works are resold over a given time span. The legal systems of the world do not universally accept the concept of droit de suite, and its economic efficiency has been a matter of debate for a few decades. In this paper, we model a work of art as a lottery to investigate experimentally the impact of this right on the art market. We find evidence that a number of known behavioral biases in decisions under uncertainty affect a seller’s willingness to accept. In light of our results, we conclude that the interaction of these biases and droit de suite can reduce the number of transactions in the art market to a larger extent than previously suggested in the literature.

Suggested Citation

Dilmaghani, Maryam and Engle-Warnick, Jim, The Efficiency of Droit De Suite: An Experimental Assessment (July 5, 2012). Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2012, 9(1), 93-121. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2101085

Maryam Dilmaghani (Contact Author)

Saint Mary's University, Sobey School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

923 Robie Street
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 3C3
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.neuropsyconomics.com/

Jim Engle-Warnick

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
Canada

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