Governing Securities Class Actions

16 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2012  

Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

University of Georgia Law School

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

This short essay, written for a symposium on The Principles and Politics of Aggregate Litigation: CAFA, PSLRA, and Beyond, decouples due process from a proceduralist’s intuition and explains why it matters in securities class actions. It begins by exploring several analytical models that shed light on the representative relationship in class actions, including a public law analogy to the administrative state, a private law analogy to corporate law, and another, more modern public law analogy to political governance. After finding that the political-governance model best addresses both sources of inadequate representation in securities class actions — rifts between class members and class counsel, and between class members and their lead plaintiff — this Essay argues that incorporating qualified class members into securities class action governance will improve due process and legitimacy in securities litigation just as it does in the political sphere.

Suggested Citation

Burch, Elizabeth Chamblee, Governing Securities Class Actions (2011). University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, 2011; UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2101345. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2101345

Elizabeth Chamblee Burch (Contact Author)

University of Georgia Law School ( email )

225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.uga.edu/profile/elizabeth-chamblee-burch

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