The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance

40 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2012 Last revised: 11 Aug 2020

See all articles by Doron Levit

Doron Levit

University of Washington, Foster School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Nadya Malenko

Boston College, Carroll School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Finance Theory Group (FTG); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: April 2016

Abstract

This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and governance, in turn, affects firms' demand for new directors. Whether the labor market rewards a shareholder-friendly or management-friendly reputation is determined in equilibrium and depends on aggregate governance. We show that directors' desire to be invited to other boards creates strategic complementarity of corporate governance across firms. Directors' reputational concerns amplify the governance system: strong systems become stronger and weak systems become weaker. We derive implications for multiple directorships, board size, transparency, and board independence.

Keywords: board of directors, corporate governance, reputation, externalities, strategic complementarity, transparency

JEL Classification: D62, D71, D82, D83, G34, G38, J20

Suggested Citation

Levit, Doron and Malenko, Nadya, The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance (April 2016). Journal of Finance, Vol. 71, No. 2, April 2016 , Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2101874 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2101874

Doron Levit

University of Washington, Foster School of Business ( email )

434 Paccar Hall, 4273 E Stevens Way NE
Seattle, WA 98195
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/doronlevit

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Nadya Malenko (Contact Author)

Boston College, Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Finance Theory Group (FTG) ( email )

United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
760
Abstract Views
5,113
Rank
60,349
PlumX Metrics