The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability

55 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2012

See all articles by Martin Ardanaz

Martin Ardanaz

Columbia University

Marcelo Leiras

Universidad de San Andrés

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 2012

Abstract

This paper contributes to an agenda that views the effects of policies and institutional reforms as dependent on the structure of political incentives for national and subnational political actors. The paper studies political incentive structures at the subnational level and the mechanisms whereby they affect national-level politics and policymaking at the national level in Argentina, a highly decentralized middle-income democracy, Argentina. The Argentine political system makes subnational political power structures very influential in national politics. Moreover, most Argentine provinces are local bastions of power dominated by entrenched elites, characterized by scarce political competition, weak division of powers, and clientelistic political linkages. Political dominance in the provinces and political importance at the national level reinforce each other, dragging the Argentine political and policymaking system towards the practices and features of its most politically backward regions.

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D78, H11, H70, H77

Suggested Citation

Ardanaz, Martin and Leiras, Marcelo and Tommasi, Mariano, The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability (June 2012). IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-327. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2102147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2102147

Martin Ardanaz (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Marcelo Leiras

Universidad de San Andrés ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, prov.Buenos Aires, 1644
Argentina
54117257040 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.udesa.edu.ar

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires B1644BID
Argentina
+5411-4725-7020 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/index.htm

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