Information Diffusion in Networks through Social Learning
46 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2012 Last revised: 4 Apr 2014
Date Written: March 21, 2014
Abstract
We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential model of social learning in networks where agents learn about a state of the world by observing the actions of their neighbors. In contrast with prior work, we do not assume that the agents' sets of neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new, weaker metric of social learning, information diffusion, that captures whether the agents eventually perform as well as if they had received the strongest possible private signals. We show that information diffusion is always attained if the neighborhoods are independently drawn, as long as a minimal connectivity condition is satisfied. However, we show that failures of information diffusion do occur when neighborhoods are correlated. We then provide two sufficient conditions for successful information diffusion. We show first that information diffuses whenever agents can identify well-connected neighbors with low distortion, a condition that ensures that observing a decision does not greatly alter its informativeness. This characterization allows us to establish positive learning results for a preferential attachment network. We also show that information diffuses whenever the network topology can be represented via a Markov chain over finitely many network topologies with independent neighborhoods.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions
By Peter M. Demarzo, Jeffrey Zwiebel, ...
-
Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds
By Matthew O. Jackson and Benjamin Golub
-
Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
By Daron Acemoglu, Munther Dahleh, ...
-
Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
By Ilan Lobel, Munther Dahleh, ...
-
Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks
By Daron Acemoglu and Asuman E. Ozdaglar
-
Rational Social Learning by Random Sampling
By Lones Smith and Peter Norman Sorensen
-
Information Percolation in Segmented Markets
By Darrell Duffie, Gustavo Manso, ...
-
Information Percolation in Segmented Markets
By Darrell Duffie, Semyon Malamud, ...
-
How Homophily Affects the Speed of Learning and Best Response Dynamics
By Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson
-
Spread of (Mis)Information in Social Networks
By Daron Acemoglu, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, ...