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https://ssrn.com/abstract=2102827
 
 

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What Can Be Wrong with an Option? An Optional Common European Sales Law as a Regulatory Tool


Horst Eidenmueller


University of Oxford; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

July 9, 2012


Abstract:     
This paper analyses the proposed optional Common European Sales Law (CESL) as a regulatory tool. In principle, an optional CESL can be a sensible means to achieve some level of harmonization and the associated transaction costs savings plus network benefits and at the same time subject the CESL to a market test. However, whether these goals will actually be achieved depends on the design conditions and the content of the option. The CESL option which is currently on the table is harmful. The Draft CESL (DCESL) is a defective product. It might nevertheless become a success on the European market for contract laws or be at least highly influential as a reference text.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: Common European Sales Law, European Contract Law, Harmonization, Regulatory Competition

JEL Classification: K12


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Date posted: July 10, 2012 ; Last revised: September 11, 2012

Suggested Citation

Eidenmueller, Horst, What Can Be Wrong with an Option? An Optional Common European Sales Law as a Regulatory Tool (July 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2102827 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2102827

Contact Information

Horst G. M. Eidenmueller (Contact Author)
University of Oxford ( email )
Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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