What Can Be Wrong with an Option? An Optional Common European Sales Law as a Regulatory Tool

19 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2012 Last revised: 11 Sep 2012

See all articles by Horst Eidenmueller

Horst Eidenmueller

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: July 9, 2012

Abstract

This paper analyses the proposed optional Common European Sales Law (CESL) as a regulatory tool. In principle, an optional CESL can be a sensible means to achieve some level of harmonization and the associated transaction costs savings plus network benefits and at the same time subject the CESL to a market test. However, whether these goals will actually be achieved depends on the design conditions and the content of the option. The CESL option which is currently on the table is harmful. The Draft CESL (DCESL) is a defective product. It might nevertheless become a success on the European market for contract laws or be at least highly influential as a reference text.

Keywords: Common European Sales Law, European Contract Law, Harmonization, Regulatory Competition

JEL Classification: K12

Suggested Citation

Eidenmueller, Horst G. M., What Can Be Wrong with an Option? An Optional Common European Sales Law as a Regulatory Tool (July 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2102827 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2102827

Horst G. M. Eidenmueller (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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