Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2103737
 


 



Asset Owners and Delegated Managers


Andrew Ang


BlackRock, Inc

July 6, 2012


Abstract:     
Asset owners (principals) typically do not manage their own investments and leave this job to delegated managers (agents). What is best for the asset owner, however, is usually not best for the fund manager. Additional agency conflicts arise when the asset owner does not know the quality and cannot infer the actions of the agent. Principal-agent conflicts can be mitigated by appropriate governance structures and contracts. The benchmark choice is important because poorly designed benchmarks in delegated asset management problems cause agents to work against what the asset owner wishes to achieve. In cases where there are many principals, effective boards can advocate for the principals’ interests, and boards should build processes for investment decisions rather than actively making direct investment decisions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Principal-agent, Boards, Delegated portfolio management, Benchmark, Optimal Contract

JEL Classification: D81, D82, G11, G12, G20, G34, M52


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Date posted: July 11, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Ang, Andrew, Asset Owners and Delegated Managers (July 6, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2103737 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2103737

Contact Information

Andrew Ang (Contact Author)
BlackRock, Inc ( email )
55 East 52nd Street
New York City, NY 10055
United States
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