The Veto as Electoral Stunt: EITM and a Test with Comparative Data
36 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2012 Last revised: 22 Aug 2012
Date Written: 2012
This paper extends Romer and Rosenthal's approach to separation of power, incorporating the use of vetoes and veto overrides, without sacrificing their explanatory power of policy outcomes. Vetoes are treated as deliberate acts of position taking in executive-legislative negotiation. The model yields comparative statics results and hence empirical implications. These are turned into seven falsifiable hypotheses on veto and override incidence. Five veto hypotheses are then tested with data from American state governments 1979-99. Substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model, including the hypothesis that assemblies controlled by parties with enough seats to override are associated with more, not less executive vetoes. A comparative research design oers advantages over single-case studies.
Keywords: EITM, executive veto, veto override, position-taking, state governments
JEL Classification: C12, C23, C72, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation