The Veto as Electoral Stunt: EITM and a Test with Comparative Data

36 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2012 Last revised: 22 Aug 2012

See all articles by Eric Magar

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

This paper extends Romer and Rosenthal's approach to separation of power, incorporating the use of vetoes and veto overrides, without sacrificing their explanatory power of policy outcomes. Vetoes are treated as deliberate acts of position taking in executive-legislative negotiation. The model yields comparative statics results and hence empirical implications. These are turned into seven falsifiable hypotheses on veto and override incidence. Five veto hypotheses are then tested with data from American state governments 1979-99. Substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model, including the hypothesis that assemblies controlled by parties with enough seats to override are associated with more, not less executive vetoes. A comparative research design o ers advantages over single-case studies.

Keywords: EITM, executive veto, veto override, position-taking, state governments

JEL Classification: C12, C23, C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Magar, Eric, The Veto as Electoral Stunt: EITM and a Test with Comparative Data (2012). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2103866

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
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