Coordination with Flexible Information Acquisition

19 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2012 Last revised: 2 Aug 2014

Date Written: August 1, 2014

Abstract

We study flexible information acquisition in a coordination game. "Flexible" acquisition means that players choose not only how much but also what kind of information to acquire. Information acquisition has a cost proportional to reduction of entropy. Hence, players will collect the information most relevant to their welfare but can be rationally inattentive to other aspects of the fundamental. When information is cheap, this flexibility enables players to acquire information that makes efficient coordination possible, which also leads to multiple equilibria. This result contrasts with the global game literature, where information structure is less flexible and cheap information leads to a unique equilibrium with inefficient coordination.

Note: This is an extensively revised version of Coordination with Rational Inattention.

Keywords: Coordination Game, Flexible Information Acquisition, Rational Inattention

JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Yang, Ming, Coordination with Flexible Information Acquisition (August 1, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2103970 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2103970

Ming Yang (Contact Author)

UCL ( email )

Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

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