Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

36 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2012

See all articles by Paula Jaramillo

Paula Jaramillo

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Cagatay Kayi

Universidad del Rosario

Flip Klijn

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History

Date Written: March 8, 2012

Abstract

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Keywords: fairness, strategy-proofness, indivisible good, land restitution

JEL Classification: D61, D63

Suggested Citation

Jaramillo, Paula and Kayi, Cagatay and Klijn, Flip, Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (March 8, 2012). Documento CEDE No. 2012-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2104277 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2104277

Paula Jaramillo (Contact Author)

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia

Cagatay Kayi

Universidad del Rosario ( email )

Calle 12 No. 6-25
Bogota, DC
Colombia

Flip Klijn

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

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