An Electoral Theory of Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules

47 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2012 Last revised: 29 Sep 2014

See all articles by Jon X. Eguia

Jon X. Eguia

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Kenneth Shepsle

Harvard University - Department of Government

Date Written: September 28, 2014

Abstract

We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously, and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda protocol or bargaining rule assigns to each legislator a probability of being recognized to make a policy proposal in the assembly. We predict that the agenda protocol chosen in equilibrium disproportionately favors more senior legislators, granting them greater opportunities to make policy proposals, and it generates an incumbency advantage to all legislators.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining, dynamic bargaining, bargaining rules, endogenous institutions, seniority, incumbency advantage

JEL Classification: D72, C78

Suggested Citation

Eguia, Jon X. and Shepsle, Kenneth, An Electoral Theory of Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules (September 28, 2014). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2105134

Jon X. Eguia (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

Kenneth Shepsle

Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )

1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 495-4928 (Phone)
(617) 496-5149 (Fax)

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