The Oil Advantage: Incumbency Effects in Iranian Parliamentary Elections

Abstract

Do leaders stay in office longer in oil-producing districts? Using evidence from parliamentary elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran, I show that oil revenues boost incumbent reelection rates. I argue that deputies in oil-rich districts are more likely to get reelected because resource revenue — distributed by the central government using a derivation formula based in part on provincial resource production levels — is used to provide public or private goods to their constituents, incentivizing voters to reelect incumbents over challengers. As case studies have illustrated, the predominance of retrospective voting in Iranian subnational elections, particularly in single-member districts, implies that oil-rich deputies can gain an electoral edge over challengers by ensuring the flow of benefits to their districts. To test this hypothesis, I employ originally collected data on six parliamentary elections in Iran (1988-2008) in longitudinal regression analysis at the district level. I augment this analysis with qualitative evidence on factional politics and non-democratic vetting procedures based on case studies of legislative elections in Iran. My findings not only offer new insights into the often misunderstood Iranian political system, but also show that deputies in a partially-democratic system behave similarly to their counterparts in advanced democracies.

Keywords: Iran, authoritarian elections, legislative behavior, natural resources, oil, incumbency advantage