Voting When the Stakes are High

43 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2012 Last revised: 24 Jul 2012

See all articles by Jon H. Fiva

Jon H. Fiva

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics

Jørgen Juel Andersen

Norwegian School of Management (BI)

Gisle James James Natvik

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

Most theories of electoral participation predict that turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive causal effect of election stakes on turnout. An implication is that local fiscal autonomy stimulates local political participation.

Keywords: Voter Motivation, Elections, Turnout

JEL Classification: D72, H71

Suggested Citation

Fiva, Jon H. and Andersen, Jørgen Juel and Natvik, Gisle James James, Voting When the Stakes are High (2012). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2105363

Jon H. Fiva (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics ( email )

Oslo
Norway

Jørgen Juel Andersen

Norwegian School of Management (BI) ( email )

P.O. Box 580
NO - 1302 Sandvika
Norway

Gisle James James Natvik

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0484
Norway

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