Symmetric Play in Repeated Allocation Games

43 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2012

See all articles by Christoph Kuzmics

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Thomas R. Palfrey

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Brian W. Rogers

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Date Written: July 14, 2012

Abstract

We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.

Keywords: symmetry, repeated games, focal points, experiments

Suggested Citation

Kuzmics, Christoph and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rogers, Brian W., Symmetric Play in Repeated Allocation Games (July 14, 2012). Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 468. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2106108 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2106108

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

Thomas R. Palfrey

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
301A Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4088 (Phone)
626-4432-1726 (Fax)

Brian W. Rogers

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www20.kellogg.northwestern.edu/facdir/facpage.asp?sid=10018

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