Multiparty Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Public Spending

32 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2012 Last revised: 2 Aug 2012

See all articles by Georg Vanberg

Georg Vanberg

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Lanny W. Martin

Rice University - Department of Political Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

A large body of research has claimed that budget-making by multiparty governments constitutes a "common pool resource" (CPR) problem that leads them to engage in higher levels of spending than single-party governments, and further, that this upwards fiscal pressure increases with the number of parties in the coalition. We offer a significant modification of the conventional wisdom. Drawing on recent developments in the literature on coalition governance, as well as research on fiscal institutions, we argue that budgetary rules can mitigate the CPR logic provided that they (a) reduce the influence of individual parties in the budget process, and (b) generate incentives to resist spending demands by coalition partners. Our empirical evaluation, based on spending patterns in fifteen European democracies over nearly forty years, provides clear support for this contention. Restrictive budgetary procedures can eliminate the expansionary fiscal pressures associated with growing coalition size. Our conclusions suggest that there is room for addressing contemporary concerns over the size of the public sector in multiparty democracies through appropriate reforms to fiscal institutions, and they also have implications for debates about the merits of "proportional'' and "majoritarian'' models of democracy that are characterized by the difference between coalition and single-party governance.

Keywords: Coalition, government spending, budget institutions

Suggested Citation

Vanberg, Georg and Martin, Lanny W., Multiparty Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Public Spending (2012). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2106493

Georg Vanberg (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Lanny W. Martin

Rice University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

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