Resolve, Satisfaction and Peaceful Coercion

43 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2012 Last revised: 22 Aug 2012

See all articles by Andrew Kydd

Andrew Kydd

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Roseanne McManus

Baruch College, CUNY

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

States attempting to peacefully coerce an adversary by building military power face a dilemma. Build too little and the adversary may challenge because the state is too weak. Build too much and the adversary may challenge because it thinks the state is bent on aggression and will attack no matter what the adversary does. We develop a model of this dilemma and show under what conditions it makes peaceful coercion impossible. We then extend the model to show how threats and assurances can help commit a state to fight challenges but not attack in the absence of a challenge, ameliorating the dilemma. We discuss insights from the model in the context of the 1930's appeasement crises, Cold War Europe, and the Gulf War.

Keywords: deterrence, compellence, conflict, game theory, formal models

Suggested Citation

Kydd, Andrew and McManus, Roseanne, Resolve, Satisfaction and Peaceful Coercion (2012). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2107118

Andrew Kydd (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Madison ( email )

716 Langdon Street
Madison, WI 53706-1481
United States

Roseanne McManus

Baruch College, CUNY ( email )

Political Science Department, Box B5280
One Bernard Baruch Way
New York, NY 10010
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.baruch.cuny.edu/rmcmanus

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
93
Abstract Views
730
Rank
506,079
PlumX Metrics