Capture, Surrender, and Reward: Warrant Enforcement and the Efficacy of International Criminal Tribunals

22 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2012 Last revised: 17 Aug 2012

See all articles by Emily Hencken Ritter

Emily Hencken Ritter

University of Alabama

Scott Wolford

University of Texas at Austin

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

International criminal tribunals cannot capture their own suspects, and states are often hesitant to put forth effort to capture suspects on their territory. However, many suspects have appeared before international courts, sometimes after capture but also after surrender, and in some cases states have worked hard to capture them in order to reap political rewards promised by interested third parties. How does the combination of domestic politics and potential international rewards affect this basic problem of capture? We analyze a game-theoretic model of the interactions between a suspect, the state in which he resides, and an interested state or international institution, deriving predictions over when and how suspects are likely to surrender or be captured. We then test these implications against a newly collected dataset of all individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Suggested Citation

Ritter, Emily Hencken and Wolford, Scott, Capture, Surrender, and Reward: Warrant Enforcement and the Efficacy of International Criminal Tribunals (2012). APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2108860

Emily Hencken Ritter (Contact Author)

University of Alabama ( email )

Box 870213
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0213
United States
205-348-3807 (Phone)

Scott Wolford

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

2317 Speedway
Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://webspace.utexas.edu/~mw24454/

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