Capture, Surrender, and Reward: Warrant Enforcement and the Efficacy of International Criminal Tribunals
22 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2012 Last revised: 17 Aug 2012
Date Written: 2012
International criminal tribunals cannot capture their own suspects, and states are often hesitant to put forth effort to capture suspects on their territory. However, many suspects have appeared before international courts, sometimes after capture but also after surrender, and in some cases states have worked hard to capture them in order to reap political rewards promised by interested third parties. How does the combination of domestic politics and potential international rewards affect this basic problem of capture? We analyze a game-theoretic model of the interactions between a suspect, the state in which he resides, and an interested state or international institution, deriving predictions over when and how suspects are likely to surrender or be captured. We then test these implications against a newly collected dataset of all individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
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