Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court Revisited

Abstract

We reevaluate the influence of amici curiae on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari. Using expanded data on four representative Court terms, we find that at the same time that the number of amicus filings on certiorari have grown -- and perhaps owing to it -- the influence of those briefs on the probability of the Court granting certiorari has steadily declined between 1968 and 2007. In addition, we find that the positive influence of briefs in opposition to certiorari noted in some earlier work appears to be an artifact of a particular Term. Among other things, these findings hold implications for the extent to which case selection effects might bias empirical scholarship on the Supreme Court.

Keywords: Supreme Court, certiorari, agenda-setting, amici curiae, judicial politics

JEL Classification: K49