EU Merger Remedies and Competition Concerns: An Empirical Assessment

22 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2012  

Wei Wang

AAlto University School of Economics

Matti Rudanko

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: July 2012

Abstract

The purpose of merger remedies is to relieve the potential competitive detriments as to preserve the efficiencies. The European Community (EC) Merger Remedies Notice requires remedies able to remove the identified competition concerns entirely and proportionately. The scope of each merger remedy package is confined by the competition concern in question. This study analyses, from an empirical point of view, the relationship between competition concerns and merger remedies. It reviews all remedies accepted in Phase II EU merger investigation and categorises them into seven sets according to their nature. Results of the empirical assessment present the frequencies of each remedy type accepted for resolving various competitions concerns and reveal that merger remedy design does vary for different competition concerns. Horizontal effects require divestiture remedies more. Other structural remedies, especially access commitment and supply commitment, have a good chance to be accepted in resolving vertical and conglomerate effects.

Suggested Citation

Wang, Wei and Rudanko, Matti, EU Merger Remedies and Competition Concerns: An Empirical Assessment (July 2012). European Law Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 4, pp. 555-576, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2110085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2012.00610.x

Wei Wang

AAlto University School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1210
Helsinki, 00100
Finland

Matti Rudanko

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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