Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2110656
 


 



Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine, Revisited


Myungho Paik


Hanyang University - College of Policy Science

Bernard S. Black


Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

David A. Hyman


Georgetown University

November 8, 2016

Journal of Health Economics, 2017, vol. 51, pp. 84-97
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-20
Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS14-21

Abstract:     
Does tort reform reduce defensive medicine and thus healthcare spending? Several (though not all) prior studies, using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, find lower Medicare spending for hospital care after states adopt caps on non-economic or total damages (“damage caps”), during the “second” reform wave of the mid-1980s. We re-examine this issue in several ways. We study the nine states that adopted caps during the “third reform wave,” from 2002-2005. We find that damage caps have no significant impact on Medicare Part A spending, but predict roughly 4% higher Medicare Part B spending. We then revisit the 1980s caps, and find no evidence of a post-adoption drop (or rise) in spending for these caps.

The online appendix can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2830255.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: medical malpractice, tort reform, defensive medicine, Medicare, healthcare spending

JEL Classification: I11, I18, K23, K32


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Date posted: July 18, 2012 ; Last revised: January 20, 2017

Suggested Citation

Paik, Myungho and Black, Bernard S. and Hyman, David A., Damage Caps and Defensive Medicine, Revisited (November 8, 2016). Journal of Health Economics, 2017, vol. 51, pp. 84-97; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-20; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS14-21. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2110656 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2110656

Contact Information

Myungho Paik (Contact Author)
Hanyang University - College of Policy Science ( email )
222 Wangsimni-ro Seongdong-gu
Seoul, 04763
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
Bernard S. Black
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
David A. Hyman
Georgetown University ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
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