Democracy, Civil-Military Relations and Defense Policy in Brazil

Abstract

Using agency theory, this paper argues that the creation of a civilian-run ministry of defense in Brazil in 1999 completely changed the relations between civilians and the military. Whereas in many periods in the past the military were the principal in these relations, now the civilians are the principal. And the positive effects of such a change on civil-military relations and defense policy expected by the scholarly literature have actually been materialized. Brazil now finally and belatedly has a Truth Commission to investigate the human rights violations committed under the military regime in 1964-1985, and its first White Book on National Defense, drafted jointly by civilians and the military. Yet the civilians who run Brazil’s ministry of defense still face daunting tasks, particularly with regards to obtaining the expertise necessary to efficiently monitor the Armed Forces. However, the trends relating to such expertise are also positive, for ministers of defense have been counting on greater human resources to exert oversight on the military over time. On the negative side, the paper also contends that the Brazilian Congress abdicated its authority in defense matters between the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution and 2007. However, in 2007-2011, during the tenure of Nelson Jobim as defense minister, important changes were effected in the conduct of defense policy. These changes provisionally revoked the congressional abdication and were closely related to the appointment of a powerful defense minister, It was, however, a fragile arrangement because it was too dependent on the figure of the defense minister and his rapport with the president. Therefore it was easily dissolved by Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff.

Keywords: Brazil, civil-military relations, defense policy, agency theory