Defensive Commitment and the Likelihood of Military Conflict in the Cross-Strait Relations

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the alliance-like arrangement involving a small challenger with external security assurances offered by a great power will affect its attempt at changing the status quo, a move offending the other regional or global dominant power. We set up game-theoretic models to account for the phenomenon, and test its general applicability by analyzing the cross-national data. In addition, we also apply the analysis to the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular relationships. Among the three, Taiwan is often seen as a small challenger, intending, at least for some people on the island, to move away from China by declaring de jure independence. Whether it would indeed challenge the status quo, i.e., declare independence, and thus offend China, depends upon its quasi-alliance with the United States. It is argued in this paper that the alliance-like arrangement between Taiwan and the U.S. may lead to conflict between Taiwan and the U.S. on the one hand and China on the other if the U.S. is perceived by Taiwan as hawkish, but will not bring about the change of the status quo otherwise.

Keywords: defensive commitment, alliance, status quo, conflict, cross-Strait relations