On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics

22 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2012

See all articles by Richard C. Cornes

Richard C. Cornes

Australian National University (ANU) - Faculty of Economics & Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Dirk T. G. Rübbelke

Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg

Date Written: July 18, 2012

Abstract

We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique non-cooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.

Keywords: public goods, public bads, aggregative games

JEL Classification: C720, H410

Suggested Citation

Cornes, Richard C. and Rübbelke, Dirk T. G., On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics (July 18, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3881. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2111957

Richard C. Cornes

Australian National University (ANU) - Faculty of Economics & Commerce ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Dirk T. G. Rübbelke (Contact Author)

Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg ( email )

Freiberg, 09599
Germany

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