Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization
21 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2012
Date Written: April 22, 2012
In Nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium, they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the optimization protocol as autarchic. Here, we ask whether natural selection might choose the optimizing protocol to be either autarchic or interdependent. That is, will Kantian players, for whom the stable concept is Kantian equilibrium drive Nash players (for whom the stable concept is Nash equilibrium) to extinction, or otherwise? The answer depends upon whether players can signal their type to others.
Keywords: Kantian equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stable strategy, cooperation
JEL Classification: C73, C62, D64
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation