The Perils of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration

4 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2012  

Jonathan B. Baker

American University - Washington College of Law

Carl Shapiro

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Date Written: July 22, 2012

Abstract

This brief comment responds to the analysis of Obama administration merger policy in Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement? 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012).

Keywords: antitrust, mergers, enforcement

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Baker, Jonathan B. and Shapiro, Carl, The Perils of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration (July 22, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2115273 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2115273

Jonathan B. Baker (Contact Author)

American University - Washington College of Law ( email )

4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States
202-274-4315 (Phone)

Carl Shapiro

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-5905 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

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