Financing and Signaling Under Asymmetric Information
47 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2012 Last revised: 5 Jun 2013
Date Written: June 1, 2013
Abstract
This paper presents a first experimental investigation of the underpricing-signaling hypothesis in a financing-investment environment under asymmetric information. Importantly, the paper tests and compares this hypothesis under the two institutions for financing offers that are commonly observed in corporate financial markets: take-it-or-leave-it offer (TLO) and the competitive bidding offer (CBO). The results suggest that underpricing can serve as a signal of quality but not sustainable as a repeat strategy. Over time, the high-quality firms converge to a pooling strategy rather than bear the cost of signaling. Additionally, underpricing is lower under CBO than under TLO institution due to competitive bidding. Signaling under CBO institution may be less salient due to possible mimicking by the low-quality firms.
Keywords: Financing, Signaling, Underpricing, Asymmetric Information, Experiment
JEL Classification: C9, G3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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