Framing Contests and Cumulation in Institutional Emergence: The Case of the Diesel Particulate Filter in Germany

University of Zurich Business Working Paper No. 302

60 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2012

See all articles by Stephane Guerard

Stephane Guerard

University of Zurich

Christoph Bode

University of Mannheim - Business School

Robin Gustafsson

Aalto University School of Economics

Date Written: July 21, 2012

Abstract

Based on an in-depth case study, this paper examines how framing contests between proponents and opponents of the Diesel particulate filter (DPF) in Germany evolve over time to affect institution creation. Our results suggest that the emergence of institution passes through three cumulative phases: necessary opening, organizing-mobilizing, instrumentalization of channels. This development is characterized by specific framing contests where the precedent phase is a necessary condition for the next to occur, a process which we conceptualize as cumulation. Our data indicate that framing contests were resolved when collective action frames which have a motivational task were crafted by the social movement with the effect of mobilizing customers, thereby creating a de facto standard i.e. the Diesel particulate filter. We argue that the motivational frame resonated because it features negative individualized evidence-based consequences and because it built on the framing contests of previous phases. Finally, we observed that framing contests tend to polarize over time, thereby reflecting the intensity of the conflict.

Keywords: Framing contest, institution emergence, social movement, collective action frame, polarization, phases, cumulation mechanism

Suggested Citation

Guerard, Stephane and Bode, Christoph and Gustafsson, Robin, Framing Contests and Cumulation in Institutional Emergence: The Case of the Diesel Particulate Filter in Germany (July 21, 2012). University of Zurich Business Working Paper No. 302. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2116153 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2116153

Stephane Guerard (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Hottingerstrasse 10
Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

Christoph Bode

University of Mannheim - Business School ( email )

L5, 5
Mannheim, 68131
Germany
+49 621 181 1659 (Phone)
+49 621 181 1653 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://procurement.bwl.uni-mannheim.de

Robin Gustafsson

Aalto University School of Economics ( email )

Finland

HOME PAGE: http://www.robingustafsson.net

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