Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan

National Taiwan University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 123~165, 2012

Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 13-14

44 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2012 Last revised: 15 Nov 2012

See all articles by Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Shirley Ching-ping Lin

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 6, 2012

Abstract

This paper extends the empirical analysis of the determinants of judicial behavior by estimating the ideal points for the Justices of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court from 1988-2009. Taiwan presents a particularly interesting case because the establishment and development of constitutional review corresponds to the country’s political transition from an authoritarian regime to an emerging democracy. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political coalitions in the Judicial Yuan based on presidential appointments. We did not find any strong evidence of such coalitions. Our empirical results indicated that, with the exception of a handful of Justices, most of them have moderate estimated ideal points. In the context of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, our results also confirm the previous econometric analysis that largely rejected the attitudinal hypothesis, which predicted that Justices would respond to their appointers’ party interests.

Keywords: Constitutional Court, Constitutional review, empirical analysis, grand justice, ideal point, Judicial Yuan, Taiwan

Suggested Citation

Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia and Garoupa, Nuno and Lin, Shirley Ching-ping, Judicial Ideal Points in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan (April 6, 2012). National Taiwan University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 123~165, 2012; Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 13-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2116155

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Shirley Ching-ping Lin

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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