Using Field Experiments to Understand Information as an Antidote to Corruption

Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 15 (New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption). Danila Serra and Leonard Wantchekon, eds., Emerald Group Publishing, Forthcoming

40 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2012

See all articles by Matthew S. Winters

Matthew S. Winters

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Political Science; Institute for Corruption Studies

Paul Testa

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Political Science

Mark Fredrickson

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

In observational data, access to information is associated with lower levels of corruption. This article reviews a small but growing body of work that uses field experiments to explore the mechanisms behind this relationship. We present a typology for understanding this research based on the type of corruption being addressed (political vs. bureaucratic), the mechanism for accountability (retrospective vs. prospective) and the nature of the information provided (factual vs. prescriptive). We describe some of the tradeoffs involved in design decisions for such experiments and suggest directions for future research.

Keywords: corruption, experiments, accountability, information

Suggested Citation

Winters, Matthew S. and Testa, Paul and Fredrickson, Mark, Using Field Experiments to Understand Information as an Antidote to Corruption (2012). Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 15 (New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption). Danila Serra and Leonard Wantchekon, eds., Emerald Group Publishing, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2116564

Matthew S. Winters (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Political Science ( email )

702 S. Wright Street
Urbana, IL 61801
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/mswinters1/home

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Paul Testa

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Political Science ( email )

702 S. Wright Street
Urbana, IL 61801
United States

Mark Fredrickson

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

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