B. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources, p. 159, Oxford University Press, 2012
33 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2012
Date Written: July 25, 2012
This chapter considers the relationship between nondiscrimination rules and supply-side incentives to invest in infrastructure. We encountered the issue throughout chapter 6. This chapter frames and evaluates the oft -made claim that government-imposed commons management will significantly impair incentives to invest in infrastructure. The impact of rules requiring nondiscriminatory sharing of infrastructural resources on the supply-side incentives to provide, maintain, and improve those resources is complex, context-specific, and not amenable to generalized, a priori conclusions. Yet policy debates are muddled with assertions about purported effects on incentives; such assertions typically are hyperbole.
Keywords: infrastructure, commons, open access, public goods, forced sharing, nondiscrimination, incentives, incentives to invest
JEL Classification: D4, D5, D6, H4, H5, H54, K00, L4, L5, L9, O1, O3, Q2, R4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Frischmann , Brett M., Supply Side Incentives (July 25, 2012). B. Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources, p. 159, Oxford University Press, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2117501