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Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms

Academy of Management Review (34), 297-319

23 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2012  

Richard Makadok

Purdue University - Department of Management; Emory University - Department of Organization & Management

Russell Wayne Coff

University of Wisconsin - Madison - School of Business

Date Written: July 26, 2009

Abstract

We create a taxonomy of hybrid governance forms and develop a formal theory that predicts when a given hybrid form will be efficient. Our model is unique in that we consider cross-task synergies in a multitask principal-agent model, where hybrid forms result as principals try to motivate cooperation among agents indirectly through incentives, ownership, and formal authority. We conclude with a discussion of other mechanisms that might also help us understand and predict hybrid governance forms.

Suggested Citation

Makadok, Richard and Coff, Russell Wayne, Both Market and Hierarchy: An Incentive-System Theory of Hybrid Governance Forms (July 26, 2009). Academy of Management Review (34), 297-319. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2117942

Richard Makadok

Purdue University - Department of Management ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.makadok.com

Emory University - Department of Organization & Management ( email )

1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
727-8639 (Phone)
727-6313 (Fax)

Russell Wayne Coff (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Madison - School of Business ( email )

975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States

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