Auction Design for Local Reserve Energy Markets

FCN Working Paper No. 7/2012 (revised March 2013)

42 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2012 Last revised: 3 Dec 2013

See all articles by Christiane Rosen

Christiane Rosen

RWTH Aachen University, E.ON Energy Research Center, Institute for Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN)

Reinhard Madlener

RWTH Aachen University

Date Written: July 2012

Abstract

In this paper we develop an auction mechanism that is designed for a local energy market. It aims to enable regionally or virtually restricted trading of ancillary services, which enhances the position of the balance group responsible party beyond that of simple accounting. Furthermore, it makes local market participants somewhat more independent from the transmission grid operator, but at the same time provides incentives for investments in distributed generation technologies. A wider spread of these technologies can help to save CO2 emissions, while at the same time a part of them can also be used to counter the fluctuations of energy from volatile renewable sources, such as wind and solar power. Because of their relatively high margins and small share in total production, ancillary services are well-suited for a remuneration scheme. Participants in the auction are, thus, private households, which imposes specific design characteristics on the auction. Most importantly, it needs to be transparent and easy to understand, as homeowners will typically not have the insights of a professional trader as well as lack a similar position and motivation. Also, the confinement to a single balance group, i.e. a local market, means that especially in the beginning of the trading only a small number of bidders can be expected. Therefore, competition will initially be limited, so that the auction design needs to be adapted accordingly. In order to test the performance of the proposed auction market design under varying information policies, a simple agent-based simulation program has been developed. We find that the theoretical predictions hold and that competition quickly leads to price convergence.

Keywords: auction, ancillary services, local market, agent-based simulation, distributed generation

Suggested Citation

Rosen, Christiane and Madlener, Reinhard, Auction Design for Local Reserve Energy Markets (July 2012). FCN Working Paper No. 7/2012 (revised March 2013) . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118602 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2118602

Christiane Rosen (Contact Author)

RWTH Aachen University, E.ON Energy Research Center, Institute for Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN) ( email )

Mathieustrasse 10
Aachen, 52074
Germany

Reinhard Madlener

RWTH Aachen University ( email )

School of Business and Economics / E.ON ERC
Mathieustraße 10
Aachen, 52074
Germany
+49 241 80 49 820 (Phone)
+49 241 80 49 829 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.eonerc.rwth-aachen.de/fcn

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
51
Abstract Views
563
rank
411,199
PlumX Metrics