The Impact of Cost Sharing Schemes on Drug Compliance: Evidence Based on Quantile Regression

28 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2012

See all articles by Vincenzo Atella

Vincenzo Atella

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS); Department of Economics and Finance; University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Joanna Kopinska

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS)

Date Written: July 27, 2012

Abstract

In this work we investigate the causal impact of cost sharing schemes on drug compliance using a Difference-in-Differences approach within a quantile regression framework. We exploit a series of natural experiments occurred in Italy between 2000 and 2010, referring to the introduction of regional co-payment schemes. We find that co-payments have a negative impact on compliance, causing a reallocation of individuals from the upper to the lower tail of the compliance distribution, thus hurting the already narrow group of good compliers. The empirical evidence suggests also that gender, clinical history and geographic residence are important drivers of compliance, particularly within the group of poor compliers.

Keywords: compliance, cost sharing, quantile regression, difference-in-differences, statins, cholesterol

JEL Classification: I10, I18, I19

Suggested Citation

Atella, Vincenzo and Kopinska, Joanna, The Impact of Cost Sharing Schemes on Drug Compliance: Evidence Based on Quantile Regression (July 27, 2012). CEIS Working Paper No. 247, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118726 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2118726

Vincenzo Atella (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS) ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
Rome, I-00133
Italy
+39 06 72595648 (Phone)

Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Columbia 2
Roma, 00133
Italy

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
I-00133 Rome, 00133
Italy
+39 06 72595635 (Phone)
+30 06 2020 500 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/sefemeq/professori/atella/

Joanna Kopinska

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Centre for International Studies on Economic Growth (CEIS) ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
Rome
Italy

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