Presidents and the Political Economy: The Coalitional Foundations of Presidential Power

Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 101-131, 2012

Posted: 6 Aug 2012

See all articles by Jacob S. Hacker

Jacob S. Hacker

Yale University - Department of Political Science; Yale University - Institution for Social and Policy Studies

Paul Pierson

University of California, Berkeley

Date Written: July 27, 2012

Abstract

Presidents shape the economy; the economy shapes presidencies. Yet analyses of presidential influence over the economy usually examine this interplay through an excessively narrow focus: the ability of presidents to shape short-term economic outcomes, particularly as these affect their own reelection prospects. Here, drawing on work in comparative political economy, we ask about the capacity of presidents to influence long-term economic developments, particularly the degree to which the economy produces broadly distributed growth. Focusing on the transformation of American tax policy over the last generation, we stress the constraints and opportunities that come from "durable policy coalitions" of partisans, activists, and organized economic interests seeking enduring shifts in governance. We develop this argument in part through a contrast with the influential views of Larry Bartels, who claims that presidents have a powerful immediate impact on economic inequality. We suggest that presidents are generally much more constrained, while attempting to clarify when and how they make a difference.

Keywords: presidential politics, reelection politics, political economy, tax policy, economic inequality

Suggested Citation

Hacker, Jacob S. and Pierson, Paul, Presidents and the Political Economy: The Coalitional Foundations of Presidential Power (July 27, 2012). Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 101-131, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2118828

Jacob S. Hacker (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jhacker

Yale University - Institution for Social and Policy Studies ( email )

89 Trumbull Street
New Haven, CT 06515
United States

Paul Pierson

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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