Competitive Information, Trust, Brand Consideration and Sales: Two Field Experiments

53 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2012

See all articles by Gui Liberali

Gui Liberali

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Erasmus University

Glen L. Urban

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

John R. Hauser

MIT Sloan School of Management

Date Written: July 2012

Abstract

Two field experiments examine whether providing information to consumers about competitive products builds trust. Established theory suggests that (1) competitive information leads to trust because it demonstrates the firm is altruistic and (2) trust leads to brand consideration and sales. In year 1 an American automaker provided experiential, product-feature, word-of-mouth, and advisor information to consumers in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 random-assignment field experiment that ran for six-months. Main-effect analyses, conditional-logit models, and continuous-time Markov models suggest that competitive information enhances brand consideration, and possibly sales, and that the effects are mediated through trust. However, in a modification to extant theory, effects are significant only for positively-valenced information. The year-2 experiment tested whether a signal, that the firm was willing to share competitive information, would engender trust, brand consideration, and sales. Contrary to many theories, the signal did not achieve these predicted outcomes because, in the year-2 experiment, consumers who already trusted the automaker were more likely to opt-in to competitive information. Besides interpreting the field experiments in light of extant theory, we examine cost-effectiveness and describe the automaker’s successful implementation of revised competitive-information strategies.

Keywords: Competitive Information, Brand Consideration, Electronic Marketing, Information Search, Signaling, Trust

Suggested Citation

Liberali, Gui and Urban, Glen L. and Hauser, John R., Competitive Information, Trust, Brand Consideration and Sales: Two Field Experiments (July 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2119141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2119141

Gui Liberali (Contact Author)

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

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Erasmus University ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://guiliberali.org

Glen L. Urban

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

E52-473
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6615 (Phone)
617-258-6617 (Fax)

John R. Hauser

MIT Sloan School of Management ( email )

International Center for Research on the Mngmt Tech.
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2929 (Phone)
617-258-7597 (Fax)

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