28 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2012
Date Written: June 21, 2012
Using a model of monopolistic competition with two countries, where we allow for technological asymmetries, we examine the relationship between intra-industry trade and environmental regulation. The decisions on emission standards set by each country show strong strategic interactions. We show that while regulations act as strategic substitutes in closed economies, this relationship may change once the countries open up to trade, depending on how the share of intra-industry trade between the two countries compares to the elasticity of substitution. While opening to trade unambiguously increases welfare, environmental regulations may increase or decrease depending on the share of intra-industry trade. In addition, we find a non-monotonic relationship between emissions and productivity.
Keywords: trade and the environment, strategic environmental policy, new trade theory
JEL Classification: Q56, F12, F18
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Echazu, Luciana and Heintzelman, Martin D., Strategic Environmental Taxation and International Trade (June 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2121674 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2121674