Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2123563
 


 



Sword or Sheath? The Benefits of Imperfect Containment (Tate to Hoko Toshiteno Hujikome Seisaku No Koyo)


George E. Shambaugh


Georgetown University - Department of Government; Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS)

Richard A. Matthew


University of California, Irvine - School of Social Ecology

October 18, 2011

Japanese Journal of International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (March 2012), pp. 35-49

Abstract:     
In a world characterized by complexity and connectedness, transnational threats – such as terrorism, cyber attack, environmental disaster, and disease – are virtually impossible to contain completely. But, how perfect does containment have to be to accomplish its core objective of limiting the reach and intensity of such threats? Using insights from a social exchange perspective on power in world politics, we argue that strategies of containment against many contemporary security threats do not need to be perfect to be effective. While critics of containment strategies are correct that containment structures often leak and typically fail to achieve some objectives fully, we argue that pursuing partial containment may be more cost effective than full containment as part of a strategy to alter threatening behavior and decrease the potency of extant or potential threats.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: containment, North Korea, transnational threat, cyber attack, environmental disaster, disease


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Date posted: August 3, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Shambaugh, George E. and Matthew, Richard A., Sword or Sheath? The Benefits of Imperfect Containment (Tate to Hoko Toshiteno Hujikome Seisaku No Koyo) (October 18, 2011). Japanese Journal of International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (March 2012), pp. 35-49. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2123563

Contact Information

George E. Shambaugh (Contact Author)
Georgetown University - Department of Government ( email )
680 Intercultural Center
Washington, DC 20057-1034
United States
202-687-2979 (Phone)
202-687-5858 (Fax)
Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-2979 (Phone)
Richard A. Matthew
University of California, Irvine - School of Social Ecology ( email )
226B Social Ecology 1
Irvine, CA 92697
United States
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