Distributive Politics and International Institutions: The Case of Drugs

Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Paper No. 6

27 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2012

See all articles by Eyal Benvenisti

Eyal Benvenisti

University of Cambridge - Lauterpacht Centre for International Law

George W. Downs

New York University (NYU)

Date Written: August 1, 2005

Abstract

WTO drug policy is of particular interest to political economists and international legal theorists interested in the distributive politics of international institutions because it embodies so many of what are believed to be the pathologies of globalization. Coercion and brinksmanship by the most powerful developed states has meant that a shared collective purpose among participants is almost totally absent. The policies of the drug regime are widely believed to be redistributive upward to the benefit of only a handful of developed states, and many aspects of the regime are arguably economically inefficient as well. There has been a continued prevalence of extra-institutional bargaining associated with the drug regime since its formation that has taken place outside the formal WTO process and unconnected to any process of collective or democratic decision making. Finally, provisions of the drug regime designed to provide the populations in poor states with broad access to drugs in an emergency have proved difficult to implement in a timely fashion.

Keywords: Medical-Legal Studies eJournal, Human Rights & the Global Economy eJournal, Public International Law eJournal

Suggested Citation

Benvenisti, Eyal and Downs, George W., Distributive Politics and International Institutions: The Case of Drugs (August 1, 2005). Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Paper No. 6. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2124074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2124074

Eyal Benvenisti (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Lauterpacht Centre for International Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

George W. Downs

New York University (NYU) ( email )

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