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Motives of Sanctioning: Equity and Emotions in a Public Good Experiment with Punishment


Paolo Crosetto


Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory

Werner Guth


Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Luigi Mittone


Università degli Studi di Trento - Department of Economics and Management

Matteo Ploner


Università degli Studi di Trento

August 7, 2012

Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2012 - 046

Abstract:     
We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning depend on the treatment: whereas punishment can reduce inequality in one treatment, it only creates another inequality in the other. To capture the effect of delay on punishment both treatments are run once with immediate and once with delayed punishment. Moreover, to investigate the effect of pure voice, all four treatments are also run in a virtual condition with no monetary consequences of punishment. Results show the emergence across all conditions of a strong norm of conditional cooperation. Punishment is generally low, it is higher when not delayed and it is not used to reduce inequality in payoffs. The main motive of sanctioning appears to be the need to punish a violation of the reciprocity norm, irrespective of monetary consequences.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: public good games, punishment, experiments, conditional cooperation

JEL Classification: C70, C72, C92, H41


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Date posted: August 8, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Crosetto, Paolo and Guth, Werner and Mittone, Luigi and Ploner, Matteo, Motives of Sanctioning: Equity and Emotions in a Public Good Experiment with Punishment (August 7, 2012). Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2012 - 046. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2126455 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2126455

Contact Information

Paolo Crosetto (Contact Author)
Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory ( email )
BP 47
38040 Grenoble
France
Werner Güth
Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )
Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Luigi Mittone
Università degli Studi di Trento - Department of Economics and Management ( email )
Via Inama 5
Trento, I-38100
Italy
Matteo Ploner
Università degli Studi di Trento ( email )
Via Giuseppe Verdi 26
Trento, Trento 38152
Italy
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