Fiscal Unions
48 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2012
There are 2 versions of this paper
Fiscal Unions
Fiscal Unions
Date Written: July 31, 2012
Abstract
We study cross-country insurance in a currency union with nominal price and wage rigidities. We provide two results that build the case for the creation of a fiscal union within a currency union. First, we show that, if financial markets are incomplete, the value of gaining access to any given level of insurance is greater for countries that are members of a currency union. Second, we show that, even if financial markets are complete, private insurance is inefficiently low. A role emerges for government intervention in macro insurance to both guarantee its existence and to influence its operation. The efficient insurance arrangement can be implemented by contingent transfers within a fiscal union. The benefits of such a fiscal union are larger, the bigger the asymmetric shocks affecting the members of the currency union, the more persistent these shocks, and the less open the member economies.
Keywords: Fiscal union, currency union, optimal currency a/rea, international insurance, fiscal and monetary policy, monetary union
JEL Classification: E6, F3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation