The Importance of Knowing Your Own Reputation

MAGKS Working Paper No. 36-2012

23 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2012

See all articles by Matthias Greiff

Matthias Greiff

Clausthal University of Technology - Department of Economics and Business Administration

Fabian Paetzel

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universit├Ąt; DFG Research Group 2104

Date Written: August 3, 2012

Abstract

We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of the next period, participants are re-matched and, except for the two control treatments, receive information resulting from the previous period's evaluations. There are three information treatments: Participants receive information either about their own evaluation or about their partner's evaluation or both. Although participants condition their contributions on their partners' evaluations, this information alone is insufficient to raise contributions. Only if participants also know their own evaluation, we do find a significant increase in contributions relative to the control treatments.

Keywords: conditional cooperation, evaluation, public good games, prisoner's dilemma, repeated games with varying partners, reputation, second-order beliefs

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D03, D83

Suggested Citation

Greiff, Matthias and Paetzel, Fabian, The Importance of Knowing Your Own Reputation (August 3, 2012). MAGKS Working Paper No. 36-2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2127063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2127063

Matthias Greiff (Contact Author)

Clausthal University of Technology - Department of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Julius-Albert-Str. 2
Clausthal-Zellerfeld D-38678
Germany

Fabian Paetzel

University of the German Federal Armed Forces - Helmut Schmidt Universit├Ąt ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, 22008
Germany

DFG Research Group 2104 ( email )

Holstenhofweg 85
Hamburg, DE 22043
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/en?set_language=en

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