The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance (?)

59 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2012 Last revised: 27 Mar 2013

See all articles by Brian R. Cheffins

Brian R. Cheffins

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: February 13, 2013

Abstract

Over the past dozen years numerous overseas based businesses with dominant shareholders have become quoted on the London Stock Exchange, prominent examples of which have joined the ‘blue chip’ FTSE 100 stock market index. While this trend has generated concerns about the ‘undermining’ of UK corporate governance and has fostered reform proposals by the Financial Services Authority it has thus far escaped academic attention. This paper explains why companies with dominant shareholders have been migrating to London and discusses the policy implications. In so doing it shows that the Financial Services Authority’s proposals mostly cover familiar ground rather than being innovative but maintains that the case for radical reform has in fact not yet been made out.

Keywords: corporate governance, corporate ownership and control, minority shareholder protection, FTSE 100, listing rules

JEL Classification: G34, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Cheffins, Brian R., The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance (?) (February 13, 2013). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 203, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 4/2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2129686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2129686

Brian R. Cheffins (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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