Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130234
 
 

References (19)



 


 



Mobile Phones and Crime Deterrence: An Underappreciated Link


Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

John MacDonald


University of Pennsylvania

Thomas Stratmann


George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

January 1, 2012

Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law, Alon Harel and Keith N. Hylton, eds., August, 2012
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-33

Abstract:     
Between 1991 and 2001, crime rates dropped by about a third across all crime categories. We suggest that the introduction and growth of mobile phone technology may have contributed to the crime decline in the 1990s, specifically in the areas of rape and assault. Given that mobile phones increase surveillance and the risks of apprehension when committing crimes against strangers, an expansion of this technology would increase the costs of crime as perceived by forward-looking criminals. We use the available mobile phone data to show that there is a strongly negative association between mobile phones and violent crimes, although data limitations preclude us from being able to make any claims about causality. We show how the intuition about mobile phones providing crime deterrence fits in well with modern discussions in the crime literature regarding optimal policy and the expanding use of private security precautions in crime prevention.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: crime, cell phones

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 17, 2012 ; Last revised: November 5, 2013

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and MacDonald, John and Stratmann, Thomas, Mobile Phones and Crime Deterrence: An Underappreciated Link (January 1, 2012). Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law, Alon Harel and Keith N. Hylton, eds., August, 2012; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-33. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130234 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2130234

Contact Information

Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

John MacDonald
University of Pennsylvania ( email )
483 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-646-3623 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.crim.upenn.edu/faculty_macdonald.htm
Thomas Stratmann (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Buchanan Center Political Economy ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-2330 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )
124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,729
Downloads: 507
Download Rank: 28,458
References:  19
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. When Antitrust Met Facebook
By Christopher Yoo

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.391 seconds