Constitutional Determinants Of Government Spending

24 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2000  

Guido Tabellini

University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo); Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2000

Abstract

This paper surveys some recent literature on fiscal policy and comparative politics. Economic policy is viewed as the outcome of a game with multiple-principals and multiple-agents. Opportunistic politicians bargain over policy. Rational voters hold them accountable through retrospective voting. Political institutions determine the rules for legislative bargaining and for electing politicians to office. The questions asked are: how do alternative electoral rules and alternative regime types shape the size of government, the composition of spending, the performance of politicians in terms of effort or corruption, the features of electoral cycles. The paper discusses both theory and evidence, and concludes with some speculations about directions for future research.

Keywords: Comparative politics, corruption, elections, fiscal policy

JEL Classification: H0

Suggested Citation

Tabellini, Guido, Constitutional Determinants Of Government Spending (March 2000). IGIER Working Paper No. 162, CESifo Working Paper No. 265. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=213068

Guido Tabellini (Contact Author)

University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) ( email )

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