Cap-and-Trade Programs Under Continual Compliance

Resources for the Future DP 12-33

34 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2012

See all articles by Makoto Hasegawa

Makoto Hasegawa

Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University

Stephen W. Salant

University of Michigan; Resources for the Future

Date Written: August 20, 2012


Price collars have frequently been advocated to restrict the price of emissions permits. Consequently, collars were incorporated in the three bills languishing in Congress as well as in California’'s AB-32; Europeans are now considering price collars for EU ETS. In advocating collars, most analysts have assumed (1) collars will be implemented by government purchases and sales from bufferstocks, just like bands on foreign exchange rates or commodity prices; and (2) …firms must surrender permits whenever they pollute. In fact, however, no actual emissions trading scheme has conformed to these assumptions. In the current paper, we maintain the second assumption (continual compliance) and show that while a price collar supported by a supported sufficiently large bufferstock can restrict permit prices, a price collar supported instead by auctions with reserve prices cannot. In a companion paper (Hasegawa and Salant 2012), we show that neither method works once account is taken of delayed compliance.

Keywords: emissions trading, marketable permits, price collar, safety valve, price ceiling, price floor

JEL Classification: Q54, Q58

Suggested Citation

Hasegawa, Makoto and Salant, Stephen W., Cap-and-Trade Programs Under Continual Compliance (August 20, 2012). Resources for the Future DP 12-33, Available at SSRN: or

Makoto Hasegawa

Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku
Kyoto, 606-8501


Stephen W. Salant (Contact Author)

University of Michigan ( email )

611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States
313-764-2370 (Phone)
313-764-2769 (Fax)

Resources for the Future ( email )

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