An Analysis of the Proposed Interchange Fee Litigation Settlement

25 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2012 Last revised: 3 Sep 2012

See all articles by Adam J. Levitin

Adam J. Levitin

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: August 21, 2012


This paper is a brief analysis of the proposed class settlement in In re Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, MDL 1720 (E.D.N.Y.). The analysis concludes that the relief plaintiff class members would obtain from the proposed settlement is largely illusory. The settlement does not result in meaningful reform of the interchange fee system and appears to provide less relief than would likely result from continued litigation. In short, the settlement is a bad deal for merchant plaintiffs and the public at large.

Keywords: interchange, credit cards, merchant discount, issuer, acquirer, Visa, MasterCard, MDL 1720, settlement, surcharge, routing, honor all cards, release

JEL Classification: K41, L41, L44

Suggested Citation

Levitin, Adam J., An Analysis of the Proposed Interchange Fee Litigation Settlement (August 21, 2012). Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-033; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 12-125. Available at SSRN: or

Adam J. Levitin (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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