The Dark Side of the Vote - Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting

55 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2012

See all articles by Rebecca B. Morton

Rebecca B. Morton

University of Iowa - Department of Political Science

Marco Piovesan

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: August 8, 2012

Abstract

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a 'dark side', i.e. result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We develop a model to predict how two types of social information shape efficiency in the presence of biased voters and we test these predictions using a novel experimental design. In line with predictions, we find that information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. In the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective. While voters with higher cognitive abilities are more likely to be de-biased by such information, most voters do not seem to interpret such information rationally.

JEL Classification: C92, D7, D02, D03

Suggested Citation

Morton, Rebecca B. and Piovesan, Marco and Tyran, Jean-Robert, The Dark Side of the Vote - Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting (August 8, 2012). Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 12-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2133832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2133832

Rebecca B. Morton

University of Iowa - Department of Political Science ( email )

Iowa City, IA 52242
United States
319-335-2358 (Phone)
319-335-3400 (Fax)

Marco Piovesan

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/piovesan/

Jean-Robert Tyran (Contact Author)

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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