European Corporate Governance: A Thematic Analysis of National Codes of Governance

29 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2012

See all articles by Jim Cicon

Jim Cicon

University of Central Missouri

Stephen P. Ferris

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance

Armin J. Kammel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Gregory Noronha

University of Washington, Tacoma - Milgard School of Business

Date Written: September 2012

Abstract

Using Latent Semantic Analysis techniques to analyse the corporate governance codes of 23 EU nations, we obtain a number of new findings regarding their thematic content, variability, and convergence. We determine that these codes can be decomposed into five common themes, with substantial cross‐sectional variability in their relative importance. We also find that the themes contained in these codes cluster in ways that are not fully consistent with the legal regime classifications of La Porta et al. (1997) , leading us to construct two new country clusters. We further discover that the identity of the code issuer (e.g., government versus stock exchange) is important in explaining a code's primary theme as well as changes in theme prominence over time. Finally, we fail to find evidence of an unchecked thematic convergence towards an Anglo‐Saxon model of corporate governance, with some code themes converging to UK practices while others diverge.

Keywords: governance, convergence, legal regimes

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Cicon, James and Ferris, Stephen P. and Kammel, Armin J. and Noronha, Gregory, European Corporate Governance: A Thematic Analysis of National Codes of Governance (September 2012). European Financial Management, Vol. 18, Issue 4, pp. 620-648, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134707 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00542.x

James Cicon (Contact Author)

University of Central Missouri ( email )

Warrensburg, MO 64093-5070
United States

Stephen P. Ferris

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance ( email )

214 Middlebush Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-6272 (Phone)
573-884-6296 (Fax)

Armin J. Kammel

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Gregory Noronha

University of Washington, Tacoma - Milgard School of Business ( email )

1900 Commerce Street
Campus Box 358420
Tacoma, WA 98402-3100
United States

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