Labor Conflicts in French Workplaces: Does (the Type of) Family Control Matter?

50 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2012 Last revised: 6 Dec 2017

See all articles by Francois Belot

Francois Belot

Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Timothée Waxin

Léonard de Vinci Pôle Universitaire

Date Written: April 13, 2015

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of family control on the quality of labor relations. Using French workplace-level data, we find that family firms experience less frequent and less intense labor conflicts. Moreover, family involvement tends to offset the negative effect of labor disputes on corporate performance. We examine whether specific family patterns are conducive to better labor relations. We distinguish active from passive family control, eponymous from non-eponymous family businesses, and break down family firms into founder-controlled and descendant-controlled companies. It appears that the benefits of family control are not attributable to a given type of family firm. These findings suggest that peaceful labor relationships are a peculiar attribute that families generally bring to corporations and extend our understanding of the “family effect” on organizational performance.

Keywords: Family firms, family management, family generations, eponymy, labor relations, profitability

JEL Classification: G32, G34, J52, J54

Suggested Citation

Belot, Francois and Waxin, Timothée, Labor Conflicts in French Workplaces: Does (the Type of) Family Control Matter? (April 13, 2015). Journal of Business Ethics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134783 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2134783

Francois Belot (Contact Author)

Université de Cergy-Pontoise ( email )

THEMA
33 boulevard du Port
Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, 95011
France
+33 1 34 25 62 33 (Fax)

Timothée Waxin

Léonard de Vinci Pôle Universitaire ( email )

Paris
France

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